New Federal Government Envisages Changes to and Intensive Use of Competition Rules
- 27/02/2025
- News
The incoming federal government which became operational on 3 February 2025 is bent on increasing “fair and healthy competition”. This is apparent from the governmental agreement of 31 January 2025 (the GA – see attached Dutch and French versions) which the federal government is committed to implementing. The GA establishes several broad principles but also envisages specific competition-enhancing measures designed to apply either across the economy or to defined industries. Here is a list of significant possible measures that, depending on the nature of the measure, will be implemented by Parliament, by the federal government, or by agency action (page references are to the Dutch-language version of the GA):
- Structural market reform (p. 27) – The GA provides for a new statute that will allow the Minister of Economic Affairs (the Minister) to take action in industries that lack competition or are subject to long-term excessive margins (defined as margins that reflect a lack of proportion between the consumer price and the quality and value of the furnished services (this principle should presumably also apply to goods)). The Minister will rely on objective findings of the Belgian Competition Authority (BCA) or the Pricing Observatory (PO). The goal will be for the Minister to “guarantee a proper functioning of markets and protect the buying power of citizens and businesses”. The proposed statute is reminiscent of the New Competition Tool which competition authorities around Europe, including the BCA, have been calling for (see, VBB Belgian Antitrust Watch of 25 October 2024).
- Consumer protection and buying power (pp. 27 and 29) – According to the GA, a strong and efficacious competition policy will benefit the consumer and increase his/her buying power. This, in turn, requires a strengthened BCA and closer cooperation between the BCA, the PO, and the economic inspection service. For its part, the PO should be able to rely on the assistance of sector regulators (the GA probably has regulators for sectors such as energy and telecommunications in mind).
- Financial services (pp. 29, 30, 62, and 63) – The GA seeks to increase competition in banking and insurance. It will try and enhance customer mobility between banks (relying in part on work undertaken by the BCA – see, VBB Belgian Antitrust Watch of 3 May 2024); ensure that citizens have sufficient access to cash (id.); study the possibilities for an easier termination of insurance contracts; and examine the decoupling of mortgages and insurance agreements for the financing of real estate.
- Beverage supply chain (p. 58) – The GA indicates that the federal government will seek an adaptation of the 2015 code of conduct governing the business relationships between beverage suppliers, beverage wholesalers, and horeca retailers. It adds that unbalanced relationships with horeca retailers should end. For that purpose, the list of unfair contract clauses will be expanded and will outlaw the possibility for the supplier to end the concomitant lease agreement for reasons extraneous to the lease that are linked to other issues such as a minimum purchase obligation for beverages.
- Agriculture (pp. 27, 60, and 61) – In the same vein, the federal government will also protect farmers by supporting prices (the precise mechanisms are not spelled out but, predictably, the BCA, the PO, and the economic inspection service will again be given a role to play); prohibiting restrictive clauses in contracts with foodstuff companies; and directing farmers towards the exemptions from the competition rules that were created for their benefit.
- Telecommunications (p. 64) – The GA promises infrastructure competition where possible, competition in services, and lower prices. In the GA, the focus is on the Belgian Institute for Postal Services and Telecommunications, even though the BCA is currently pursuing major procedures in the sector (see e.g., regarding infrastructure competition, VBB Belgian Antitrust Watch of 30 July 2024).
The GA clearly does not address every significant current competition topic. For example, it does not discuss the possibility of conferring on the BCA the power to “call in” and review mergers that would not normally qualify for competition scrutiny because they do not satisfy the financial thresholds for doing so. However, since that power is high on the wishlist of the BCA (see, VBB Belgian Antitrust Watch of 25 October 2024), it may become a reality when other statututory changes to the competition rules are being considered.